

# Risk Assessment for Flood Risk Management Studies



## Geotechnical Aspects of Risk Assessment

Brian Hubel, PE, GE  
Geotechnical Engineer

South Pacific Dam Safety Production Center  
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



US Army Corps of Engineers  
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# Four Part Presentation

**Part 1: What is Geotechnical Engineering**

Part 2: Geotechnical engineering for planning studies

Part 3: Developing performance functions

Part 4: Trouble-shooting HEC-FDA results




# What is Geotechnical Engineering?

- **Geotechnical engineering:** a branch of civil engineering concerned with the engineering behavior of earth materials. It uses the principles and methods of geology, soil mechanics and rock mechanics for the solution of engineering problems and the design of engineering works.

# Geotechnical and Geologic Studies

## Understand the Geology

- Regional Geology
- Local Geology
- Site specific investigations



Elevation (ft MVD 29)	Depth (ft)	SAMPLES		Graphic Log	MATERIAL DESCRIPTION	Water Content, %	Dry Unit Weight, lb/ft <sup>3</sup>	REMARKS AND OTHER TESTS
		Type	Blows / 6 in.					
0	0				FILL (af): SANDY LEAN CLAY (CL), yellowish brown (10YR 5/6), moist, mostly medium plasticity clay, some fine to medium and trace coarse sand, trace fine to coarse gravel to 1 in.	0.4		Start drilling at 1115. Sample #1 1.05 ft. COMP: E=11 LL=36, Ph=2 SA: 52% #200 #D: 25% #20
-675	14	B-1	14		Hard, trace black organic material, trace roots			
	12	S-2	31		ALLUVIUM (So): SANDY LEAN CLAY (CL), olive yellow (2.5Y 6/6), hard, moist, mostly medium plasticity clay, some fine sand, weak cementation, trace organic, orange oxidation staining	12.4	107.1	
	19	S-3	15					
	10	S-3	24		SANDY SILT (ML), light olive brown (2.5Y 5/4), hard, moist, mostly silt, some fine sand, weak to moderate cementation, orange oxidation staining	11.5		
	14							
-570	10				ALLUVIUM (Sp): SILTY SAND (SM), light olive brown (2.5Y 5/4), dense, moist, mostly fine and fine medium to coarse sand, some silt, trace fine gravel, weak cementation, orange oxidation staining			
	6	S-4	18		Little to some silt	7.9	94.7	CONS. DS SA: 34% #200 #D: 4% #20
	28				POORLY GRADED SAND (SP), light yellowish brown (2.5Y 6/3), dense, moist, mostly fine sand, trace to fine silt, trace coarse sand and fine gravel			
-565	15	S-5	23		WELL GRADED SAND WITH GRAVEL (SW), pale yellow (2.5Y 8/3), dense, moist, mostly fine to coarse sand, little to some fine to coarse gravel to 2-1/4 in.	1.4	116.4	
	23	S-6	24					
-560	20				SILTY SAND (SM), yellow (10YR 7/6), dense, moist, mostly medium to coarse sand, some silt, few fine gravel			
	11	S-6	11		Becomes fine to coarse sand	3.7	102.0	CONS. DS
	24				SANDY SILT (ML), light olive brown (2.5Y 5/4), hard, moist, some fine sand, orange oxidation stains			
	15	S-7	15					
-555	25	S-7	504*	504*	POORLY GRADED SAND (SP), light yellowish brown (2.5Y 6/3), very dense, moist, mostly fine to medium sand, trace coarse sand and fine gravel			Bag sample. Auger refusal on gravel top to 10 in. at 25 ft. Below 5 ft north of borehole. SA: 7% #200 #D: 3% #20
	21	S-7a	21	502*	Gravel layer encountered in original borehole; refusal			
	102*				WELL GRADED SAND WITH SILT AND GRAVEL (SW-SM), light yellowish brown (2.5Y 6/3), very dense, moist, mostly medium and fine fine and coarse sand, little fine gravel to 3/4 in., few silt	0.6		



# Laboratory Testing

## DIRECT SHEAR TEST ASTM D 3080



Project Name : Prado Dam Spillway Modifications  
Project Number : 60600253

Boring No.: H19-2  
Sample No.: 6  
Sample Depth (ft.): 20

Specimen Description : Very pale brown Well-graded SAND with Silt (SW-SM)

Apparatus No.: DS2  
Shear rate (in/min): 0.005


Normal Stress (psf): 2638 ●  
Normal Stress (psf): 5087 ◆  
Normal Stress (psf): 9993 ▲



Types	Unit Weight (psf)	Drained Strength	Consolidation Properties	Saturated Hydraulic conductivity	Undrained Strength $S_u$ (psf)
New Levee Fill	125	$\phi' = 32^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	N/A—compacted, highly over consolidated	$8 \times 10^{-6}$ cm/sec or lower	800
Existing Levee Fill Station 150 to 199	125	$\phi' = 32^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	N/A—compacted, highly over consolidated	$8 \times 10^{-6}$ cm/sec or lower	800
Desiccated Bay Mud Stations 95 to 144	100	$\phi' = 32^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	$C_c=1.22$ (varies) $C_r=0.19$ (varies) $OCR=2.5$ (varies)	$8 \times 10^{-7}$ cm/sec	Range from 130 to 270 psf based on stress history
Normally Consolidated YBM Station 95 to 144	100	$\phi' = 31^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	$C_c=0.34$ $C_r=0.05$ $OCR = 1.1$ (varies)	$8 \times 10^{-7}$ cm/sec	Range from 250 to 360 psf
Overconsolidated Bay Mud (Reach 5) Station 144 to 199	100	$\phi' = 32^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	$C_c=0.25$ (varies) $C_r=0.09$ (varies) $OCR= TBD$	$8 \times 10^{-7}$ cm/sec	1000
Clayey Alluvium	125	$\phi' = 32^\circ$ ; $c' = 100$ or less	$C_c= 0.23$ (varies) $C_r = 0.06$ (varies) $OCR= 2$ (varies)	$1 \times 10^{-6}$ cm/sec	2000
Sandy alluvium	125	$\phi' = 34^\circ$ ; $c' = 0$	N/A	$2 \times 10^{-3}$ cm/sec	N/A
Filter Sand	125	$\phi' = 34^\circ$ ; $c' = 0$	N/A	$2 \times 10^{-2}$ cm/sec	N/A
Gravel toe drain	135	$\phi' = 36^\circ$ ; $c' = 0$	N/A	1 cm/sec	N/A


# Analysis

- Slope Stability
- Seepage
- Settlement
- Bearing Capacity
- Lateral Earth Pressures
- Filters
- Dewatering
- Pile Capacity
- Earthquake Ground Motions
- Liquefaction Potential



# Evaluate Performance and Recommend Designs

Palo Alto Flood Basin



	PED	Final Integrated Document
Alignment	Along with inboard, non-engineered dike of Pond A18	No change
Crest: Elevation	15.2 feet	No change
Crest: Width (typical)	16.0 feet	16.0 feet (minimum)
Crest: Width (turnout)	28.0 feet	Not defined
Crest: Cross Slope (from centerline)	3 percent	2 percent
Crest: Post-Construction Settlement	Varies, depending on location	Not defined
Slope	3H:1V (maximum)	No change
Slope: Erosion Project (bayward)	Reinforced turf mat to be covered by ecotone	Not defined
Slope: Erosion Protection (landward)	TBD	Not defined
Access Road: Material	Aggregate base ( 8 inches)	Aggregate Base
Access Road: Width (typical)	12 feet	Undefined
Access Road: Width (turnout)	26 feet	

# Part 2 Outline: Geotechnical engineering for planning studies

- USACE policy and guidance
- Overtopping vs breach prior to overtopping
- Risk equation
- Performance function definition
- Geotechnical impacts to B/C ratio
- Level of effort for SMART Planning



# “Current” Guidance


- ETL 1110-2-588 Geotechnical System Response Curves for Risk Assessments, 15 October 2020
- ETL 1110-2-561 Reliability Analysis And Risk Assessment For Seepage And Slope Stability Failure Modes For Embankment Dams (**expired 30 June 2010**)
- New EM 1110-2-1913, Design and Construction of Levees, may have some R&U guidance when it is approved.

# Basin Impact Cases



# Risk Equation


- Risk = Hazard x Performance X Consequences



# Geotechnical System Response Curve

From ETL 1110-2-588:

“The system response curve represents the conditional **probability of failure** leading to inundation and associated economic/life safety consequences”



Peak Water Elevation (ft.)	Pf PFM - 1	Pf PFM-2	Pf PFM-3	Pf PFM-4	Pf PFM-5	OVERALL
	8	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0.1	0	0.10
10	0	0.03	0	0.5	0.01	0.52
11	0.05	0.05	0	0.9	0.01	0.91

# Geotechnical Engineering and the B/C Ratio

- Geotechnical engineering often impacts both benefits and costs. Poor performance = lots of potential benefits, but requires expensive design to remediate.
- Performance functions developed by geotechnical engineers impact HEC-FDA calculations of damages and benefits. Needed for without project and with project
- Geotechnical design requirements impact costs associated with construction of new or improvements to levees, dams, spillways, weirs, etc. Geotechnical Uncertainty is sometimes a major contributor to cost and schedule risk

# Level of Effort for SMART Planning

- All the engineering that matters and none that doesn't matter.
- Get the future without project models up and running as soon as possible.
- Perform sensitivity analysis
- Identify inputs that will impact results
- Fair comparison of alternatives vs level of accuracy for budgeting?
- Increased accuracy of new project may be needed for focused array and TSP and/or LPP
- “Regardless of which method is chosen to develop performance functions, a clear rationale shall be provided in study documentation to support the method used and describe the limitations of the use of the performance function.”



# Part 2 Review: The Big Picture

- USACE policy and guidance
- Overtopping vs breach prior to overtopping
- Risk equation
- Performance function definition
- Geotechnical impacts to B/C ratio
- Level of effort for SMART Planning

# Part 2 Outline:

## Developing Performance Functions

- Poor performance vs. levee breach
- Geotechnical failure modes
- Performance function development approaches
- Applying approaches to failure modes
- Combining individual failure mode curves

# Part 3 Outline:

## Developing Performance Functions

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# Typical Geotechnical Failure Modes

- Embankment stability
- Underseepage
- Through seepage
- Erosion
- Contributing factors
  - Encroachments
  - Utilities
  - Animal Burrows
  - Vegetation

# Failure Mode Identification

**Slope Instability of the Landside Levee Slope PFM-1:** In this failure mode, water seeps through the levee, causing a reduction of effective stress of the soils. The landside of the levee fails and causes loss of levee crest elevation, water overtopping and levee breach

**Under seepage Causes a Landside Boil, PFM-2:** In this failure mode, a sand layer is located directly beneath the bay mud, transmitting high pore pressures from the waterside of the levee to the landside of the levee and have a vertical gradient across the blanket that causes a sand boil at the toe of the levee

**Wind waves erode the levee, PFM-3:** In PFM-3 wind-induced waves cause erosion of the levee from the bay side toward the interior of the flood basin.

**Levee Overtopping, PFM-4:** In this failure mode water overtops the levee, causing erosion on the landside of the levee, that eventually leads to breach.





# Poor Performance vs. Failure

- Past confusion of poor performance vs. failure
  - From ETL 1110-2-588:  
*The system response curve represents the conditional probability of failure leading to inundation and associated economic/life safety consequences*
- Poor performance examples:
  - Landside slump with factor of safety (FOS)  $< 1$  that does not breach the levee
  - Heave at the levee toe with boils with FOS  $< 1$  but does not progress to failure.
- Failure Examples
  - Water enters the economic impact area from the channel
  - Carpets get wet...




# Failure Event Progression

Figure 2.  
Event Tree for: PFM 2

PFM 2 Description: Water loading causes under seepage and uplift gradients on the landside of the levee that lead to soil piping, increasing seepage, erosion and levee collapse, allowing the water to overtop the levee and eventually leading to breach.

Hydraulic Loading: This failure mode may occur at any water level, but is more likely as the water level increases on the levee height.



Field borings and other investigations may be needed

There is sometimes a need for heavy geotechnical analysis here

# Poor Performance vs. Levee Failure



# Poor Performance vs. Levee Failure



David Rogers



# Poor Performance vs. Levee Failure



*Unanticipated Failure of Sutter Bypass Levee in the 1997 Floods.*

# Poor Performance vs. Levee Failure

**(SOURCE: Kjeldsen, Sinnock & Neudeck Inc.)**






# Curve Development Approaches

- From ETL 1110-2-588:
  - *There are several methods that may be used to evaluate the system response component of risk, including reliability analysis (probabilistic limit state), empirical, frequency based and expert elicitation methods, as contained in Reference 3.c*
- **Probabilistic Limit State**
  - Need a lot of data
  - Takes time and funding
  - Probability of poor performance (may be useful for comparative purposes)
- **Empirical**
  - Failure probabilities based on correlations with observed performance of similar projects (levee screening tool)
- **Frequency based**
  - Use event trees
  - Informed by analysis at key event tree nodes
  - Use judgment for other event tree nodes
    - Expert panel
    - Risk cadre
    - Local cadre with RMC-trained facilitator
- **Expert elicitation**
  - Uses available data
  - Quicker and less expensive
  - Not repeatable
  - Probability of Breach prior to overtopping



# Statistical Computation



**Underseepage Analysis**  
**Levee on Infinite length foundation**

T. F. Wolff  
 September 1994

H =   
 x2 =

	kf/kb	z	d	x3	s	ho	i	Variance component	% of variance	
mean	1000	8	80	800.00	910.00	9.357	1.170			
	600	8	80	619.68	729.68	9.185	1.148			
	1400	8	80	946.57	1058.57	9.451	1.181	0.000276532	0.30	
	1000	6	80	692.82	802.82	9.265	1.544			
	1000	10	80	894.43	1004.43	9.421	0.942	0.090606378	99.69	
	1000	8	75	774.60	884.60	9.337	1.167			
	1000	8	85	824.62	934.62	9.375	1.172	5.55296E-06	0.01	
	Total								0.090888464	100.00

E[i] = 1.170  
 Var[i] = 0.090888  
 sigma[i] = 0.301477  
 V(i) = 25.78%

E[ln i] = 0.12449  
 sigma[ln i] = 0.253629

i crit =

ln(i crit) = -0.16252

**Pr(f) = 0.871101**

# Statistical Computation

System Response Curves for All Failure Modes at All Locations

Location

Overtopping






Underseepage

Through Seepage






Stability

Erosion






1



2




3



Controlling  
(Highest Pf for Largest AEP)

# Statistical Computation



# Part 3 Review

## Developing Performance Functions

- Poor performance vs. levee failure
- Geotechnical failure modes
- Performance function development approaches
- Applying approaches to failure modes
- Combining individual failure mode curves

# Part 3 Outline

## Trouble-Shooting HEC-FDA Results

- Annual Exceedance Probability
- Determining if results are reasonable
- Sources of unreasonable results
- Case Study: Natomas

# Part 4 Outline

## Trouble-Shooting HEC-FDA Results

- Annual Exceedance Probability
- Determining if results are reasonable
- Sources of unreasonable results
- Case Study: Southbay Shoreline I



# Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP)

- The probability in a given year that **flood waters will enter the economic impact area.**
- $AEP = 1/\text{recurrence interval}$
- In the vernacular, recurrence interval is the same as a nominal x-year event.
- An impact area with an AEP of 0.05 (or 1/20) has a recurrence interval of 20 years and is said to have 20-year protection.

# Determining if Results are Reasonable

Example 1: The NED plan and LPP are aligned and are believed to provide about 100-year protection. Which of the following ranges might you use to judge the reasonableness of the **with-project** HEC-FDA model results?

- AEP between 1/1 and 1/1000
- AEP between 1/90 and 1/110
- AEP between 1/50 and 1/200
- B/C ratio greater than 3

# Determining if Results are Reasonable

Example 2: An impact area has not flooded during the 150 years records have been kept. However, extensive flood fighting saved the levee during three different flood events and PL84-99 repairs were made after each of the flood events. Which of the following statements about the future without project condition are likely to be true?

- The impact area has at least 150-year protection, AEP is less than 1/150.
- The AEP is likely between 1/10 and 1/100
- Depending upon the sensitivity of the model to the performance functions, additional research may be warranted to refine the future without project performance curves.

# Types of Unexpected AEP Results

- Without project AEP does not match past performance.
- With project AEP doesn't match expected performance.
- Does unexpected mean unreasonable?
- What are possible sources of unexpected HEC-FDA results.

# Sources of Unexpected AEP Results

- Levee crest elevation is inaccurate (datum or new construction).
- Recent upstream levee improvements reduce upstream levee failures. Past performance is no longer a predictor of future performance.
- Stage-frequency is not sufficiently accurate.
- Performance function is not sufficiently accurate.
- Interaction between multiple index points in one impact area.




# Case Study

- Shoreline I Levee Project
- Immature Guidance at the Time
- Surprising results
- Trouble-shooting
- Current status

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# South San Francisco Bay Shoreline. Some Lessons Learned



# Shoreline Early Work

- Very high frequency of flooding didn't match reality
  - Uncertainty of datums
  - Model coding (monte carlo, vs joint probability calculations)
  - Length considerations vs Index Points
  - Difficulty modeling of  $P_u$  vs  $P_f$

Many engineers tend to make conservative decisions.


What is wrong with this table?

Handbook and Data Chart Series, California


Slip Surface	Probability of Unsatisfactory Performance, $P_u$ : FS<1.1					
	Area 1	Area 2	Area 3	Area 4	Area 5	Area 6
Shallow	92%	98%	77%	83%	99%	1%
Half Levee	62%	79%	67%	27%	99%	0.5%
Full Levee	23%	46%	58%	5%	98%	0.1%



# Everything should be done to FS = 1.0 (remember poor performance vs failure)





Slip Surface	Probability of Unsatisfactory Performance, $P_u$ : FS < 1.1					
	Area 1	Area 2	Area 3	Area 4	Area 5	Area 6
Shallow	92%	98%	77%	83%	99%	1%
Half Levee	62%	79%	67%	27%	99%	0.5%
Full Levee	23%	46%	58%	5%	98%	0.1%



# Aleatory Variability and Epistemic Uncertainty in Geotechnical Engineering

- Aleatory Variability – randomness of process
- Epistemic Uncertainty - The epistemic uncertainty is characterized by alternative models.

# Aleatory Variability or Epistemic Uncertainty



# Part 4 Outline

## Trouble-Shooting HEC-FDA Results

- Annual Exceedance Probability
- Determining if results are reasonable
- Sources of unreasonable results
- Case Study: Shoreline

# Any Questions?



**Performance Functions**

# Schedule Issues

- Without project model schedule:
  - SMART Planning is iterative
  - Time for first iteration is about 3 months
- Perfect fragility curves:
  - don't represent actual residual risk
  - won't support a risk-based design
  - useful for sensitivity study or to support no TSP